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KELSEN AND AQUINAS ON
"THE NATURAL-LAW DOCTRINE"
Robert P. George*

INTRODUCTION

The fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Hans Kelsen's influential essay, The Natural-LawDoctrine Before the Tribunal of Science,' provides an occasion to revisit a work in which the leading European legal
theorist of the twentieth century outlined and strongly criticized the
tradition of natural law theorizing. Contemporary scholars on the
Continent and in the English-speaking world will, no doubt, examine
Kelsen's essay from a variety of angles. I am struck, however, by the
fact that it makes no reference whatsoever to the thought of the most
famous and influential of all natural law theorists, namely, Saint
Thomas Aquinas. Kelsen refers frequently to the writings of Gennain
Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, G. W.
F. Hegel, and classical Greek philosophers; but Aquinas's theory, or
"doctrine," of natural law is left unaddressed. If, however, something
called "the natural-law doctrine" can be attributed to anyone, surely it
can be attributed to Aquinas. I propose, therefore, to consider
(1) the extent to which Kelsen's exposition of "the natural-law doctrine" captures or describes Aquinas's account of natural law and
(2) whether Kelsen's critique of natural law ethics and jurisprudence
2
tells against the teachings of Aquinas.
* McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University. The author
gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Earhart Foundation.

1 Hans Kelsen, The Natural-Law DoctrineBefore the Tribunal of Science, W. POL. Q.,
Dec. 1949, at 481, 481, rprintedin HANS KELSEN, WHAT isJusTIcE? JusICE, LAW, AND
PoLrncs IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE: CoLLEcE EssAYS BY HANS KELSEN 137, 137
(1957).
2

I shall, for the most part, refrain from commenting on the accuracy of Kelsen's

attributions to other natural law thinkers of the various propositions he asserts to be
constitutive of, or in some sense integral to, "the natural-law doctrine." For what it is
worth, my view is that Kelsen's essay is, on this score, a "mixed bag."
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NATURAL LAW, MORAL TRUTH, AND RELIGION

Let us begin by considering, sentence by sentence, the opening
paragraph of Kelsen's essay.
Sentence One: "The natural-law doctrine undertakes to supply a
definitive solution to the eternal problem of justice, to answer the
question as to what is right and wrong in the mutual relations of
men."3
Aquinas is concerned with "right and wrong" not only in "the mutual relations of men," but in human affairs generally. He famously
argues that all acts of virtue, and not merely those ordained to the
4
common good narrowly conceived, are the subject of natural law.
Questions ofjustice are, to be sure, central to his thought, but they are
not the only questions. His prescriptions concern what we would call,
though he did not, "self-regarding" as well as "other-regarding" conduct.5 The principles and norms of natural law, as Aquinas understands them, would have relevance to the man permanently stranded
alone on an island. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Kelsen's statement is true, so far as it goes, when applied to Aquinas's conception of
"the natural-law doctrine."
Sentence Two: "The answer is based on the assumption that it is
possible to distinguish between human behavior which is natural, that
is to say which corresponds to nature because it is required by nature,
and human behavior which is unnatural, hence contrary to nature
'6
and forbidden by nature."
Aquinas does, sometimes, employ the terms "natural" and "unnatural" in a morally normative sense. However, he makes abundantly
clear that human choosing and acting is "natural" or "unnatural" in
7
such a sense precisely insofar as it is reasonable or unreasonable.
Other natural law theorists have sought to infer the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of a possible choice or action from judgments
supra note 1, at 137.

3

KELSEN,

4

See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 3 (Fathers of the

Eng. Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros., Inc. 1947) (1485).
5 However, Aquinas is hardly oblivious to the distinction. See id. at pt. I-11, q. 91,
art. 4 (deploying the distinction in teaching that it is unwise for human law to prohibit every act of vice).
6 KELSEN, supra note 1, at 137.
7 See 4 THOMAS AQUINAS, SCRIPTUM SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM d. 2, q. 1, art. 4,
sol. 1, ad. 2 (Maria Fabianus Moos ed., 1947) (1469) (stating that moral precepts are
in accord with human nature because they are requirements of natural reason); AQUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. I-II, q. 71, art. 2 ("[V]irtue[s] ... [are] in accord with man's
nature, for as much as [they] accord[] with his reason: while vice[s] [are] contrary to
man's nature, in so far as [they are] contrary to the order of reason.").
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about its naturalness or unnaturalness, 8 and this approach is sometimes, though mistakenly, attributed to Aquinas. 9 The truth is, however, that for Aquinas, things work precisely the other way around: it is
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a choice or action that
controls judgment as to its naturalness or unnaturalness in any morally normative sense.10
Sentence Three: "This assumption implies that it is possible to
deduce from nature, that is to say from the nature of man, from the
nature of society, and even from the nature of things certain rules
which provide an altogether adequate prescription for human behavior, that by a careful examination of the facts of nature we can find
the just solution of our social problem.""
Aquinas certainly assumed no such thing. In his famous treatment of the question whether the natural law contains several
precepts or only one, he says that the first principles of practical reason, which are the basic precepts of natural law, are self-evident (per se
nota) and indemonstrable. 2 As such, they are not deduced from
priorjudgments about nature, human nature, the nature of society, or
anything else. 13 On the contrary, practical reasoning proceeds from
its own first principles. We need not look to physics, metaphysics, anthropology, sociology, or any other speculative (or, to use the Aristotelian term, "theoretical") discipline to supply them.' 4 Of course,
information drawn from these disciplines, when considered in the
light of practical principles, can be highly pertinent to moral inquiry.15 Indeed, such information is often indispensable to sound
judgments of right and wrong.1 6 But according to Aquinas, the pri8 See, e.g., THOMAS J. HIGGINS, MAN As MAN: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF ETHics
49-69, 88-100, 120-26 (1958).
9 See LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAw AND JusTrIcE 58 (1987) ("[N]atural law
[according to Aquinas] directs us to fulfill our natural inclinations .... .").
10 For a careful and amply documented explanation of this critical point, see
JOHN FnNNis, AQUINAS: MORAL, PoLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 90-94 (1998).
11 KELSEN, supra note 1, at 137.
12 See AQuINAS, supra note 4, at pt. I-IL, q. 94, art. 2. On the (much misunderstood) meaning of "self-evidence" in Thomistic ethical theory, see Robert P. George,
Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1387-89, 1413 (1988).
13 See Germain Grisez, The First Principle of PracticalReason: A Commentary on the
Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2, 10 NAT. L.F. 168 (1965).
14 See FINNIs, supra note 10, at 90-94.
15 See George, supra note 12, at 1412-14.
16 So, for example, knowledge of the facts of human embryogenesis and intrauterine human development is critical to a proper application of moral principles
to the question of abortion.
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mary principles of practical reason and basic precepts of natural law
are not "deduce[d] from nature" (or anything else).
Sentence Four: "Nature is conceived of as a legislator, the suu7
preme legislator.'
Not according to Aquinas. True, he allows that human goods
and the norms of morality directing choice and action with respect to
these goods (and their privations) would be different if human nature
were different-if, that is to say, human beings were fulfilled and perfected by activities and purposes ("goods") other than those that in
fact fulfill and perfect us.18 In this sense, morality and its content depend on (human) nature.' 9 But precisely because we do not (and,
indeed, cannot) deduce the "ought" of morality from the "is" of nature (or anything else-including God's will),20 it is a mistake, or so
Aquinas would say, to imagine that we could discover moral truth by
inquiring into the intentions or purposes of nature conceived as some
sort of law-giver.
Moving to the second paragraph of Kelsen's essay, we can see
even more clearly that his account of "the natural-law doctrine" is at
sharp variance with what Aquinas teaches about the natural law:
This view presupposes that natural phenomena are directed toward
an end or shaped by a purpose, that natural processes or nature
conceived of as a whole are determined by final causes. It is a thoroughly teleological view, and as such does not differ from the idea
that nature is endowed with will and intelligence. This implies that
nature is a kind of superhuman personal being, an authority to
21
which man owes obedience.
Whatever views about final causes Aquinas retains from Aristotle's
thought, he certainly would reject "the idea that nature is endowed
with will and intelligence." Nature is not, in Aquinas's account, "a
kind of superhuman personal being." Nor is the ground of our moral
obligations a debt of obedience to the "will" of nature or, indeed, any
other authority. Unlike many later theorists of natural law, Aquinas
eschewed the voluntarism implied by this conception of moral obligation.2 2 The force of practical-including moral-principles, accordsupra note 1, at 137.

17

KELSEN,

18
19

SeeJOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATuRAL RIGHTS 34 (1980).

See Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Nature, in NATURAL

LAW THE-

ORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 31 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).

See FiNNis, supra note 10, at 90.
supra note 1, at 137.
On the impact of voluntarism on Christian moral theology after Aquinas, see I
GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JEsus: CHRIsTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 12-13
(1983). In the same work, Grisez provides a powerful critique of voluntarism and
20
21
22

KELSEN,
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ing to Aquinas, is rationa these principles state reasonsfor action and
23
restraint, and to defy them is wrong inasmuch as it is unreasonable.
In this sense, the natural law is not an extrinsic imposition of an alien
will-whether the "will" of nature or anything (or anybody) else. It is,
rather, intrinsic to human beings; its fundamental referents are the
human goods that constitute human well-being and fulfillment and
24
precisely, as such, are reasons for action.
Moving now more deeply into Kelsen's second paragraph, we
find him arguing as follows:
At a higher stage of religious evolution, when animism is replaced
by monotheism, nature is conceived of as having been created by
God and is therefore regarded as a revelation of his all powerful and
just will. If the natural-law doctrine is consistent, it must assume a
religious character. It can deduce from nature just rules of human
behavior only because and so far as nature is conceived of as a manifestation of God's will, so that examining nature amounts to exploring God's will. As a matter of fact, there is no natural-law doctrine
of any importance which has not a more or less religious
25
character.
According to Aquinas, the natural law is the "rational creature's
participation of the eternal law," 26 and "the eternal law" is the su-

preme act of (practical) reason by which an omnipotent and
27
omnibenevolent Creator freely orders the whole of His creation.
Thus, the natural law is a part of the rational plan by which God providentially governs the created order. 28 In this sense, Aquinas's natural
law doctrine can be regarded as having a "religious character." Its
defense of the authentically Thomistic alternative account of moral obligation as a
kind of rational necessity. See id. at 103-05; see also FINNIs, supra note 18, at 42-48,
337-43.
23 See FNmus, supra note 10, at 79-86.
24 Seeid.
25 KELsEN, supra note 1, at 138.
26 AQuiNAs, supra note 4, at pt. I-II, q. 91, art. 2.
27 See id at pt. I-II, q. 91, art. 1.

28 Finnis sums up Aquinas's teaching on "the eternal law" as follows:
God envisages and freely chooses the whole order of things, prescribing (so
to speak) that order by impressing its principles (the "laws of physics," the
"laws of logic," and so forth) onto or into the various orders of created entity
and process. And this act is to the common benefit of the whole (and thus
of its parts). So we can think of this supreme act of government as legislative, and its rational content as a law which, like its author, is timeless (even
though that content is freely chosen, not necessary, and regulates creatures
which are all within time).
FnmILs, supra note 10, at 307 (footnotes omitted).
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religious character, however, has nothing to do with any putative deduction from nature, conceived as revelatory of the will of God or
anyone (or anything) else, of moral nons, or of other "rules of
human behavior." There is no sense, for Aquinas, in which one "reads
off" from nature (or human nature) God's will regarding human
29
conduct.
It is worth pausing here to observe, moreover, that there is no
sense in which the natural law, as the eternal law's participation in the
rational creature, is incompatible with human freedom. The dependency of human choice and action on divine power and causality does
not vitiate the human power of creative free choice. Indeed, Aquinas
interprets the biblical teaching that man is an imago dei3° precisely as
meaning that human beings are endowed with the God-like attributes
of practical rationality and freedom:
Man is said to be made to God's image, in so far as the image implies an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement: now

that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e., God, and of those things
which come forth from the power of God in accordance with His
will, it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e., man, inasmuch as he
too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of
31
his actions.
Thus it is that, though God directs the brute animals to their proper
ends by instinct or "natural appetite," He directs human beings to
their proper ends by the God-like power of practical reason, namely,
the power to understand what is humanly (including morally) good
and bad and the freedom to choose to act in light of the reasons thus
32
provided.
According to Aquinas, the whole of the created order is suffused
with meaning and value inasmuch as it is the product of God's free
and intelligent action.3 3 At the same time, part-though not all-of
the created order also has meaning and value by virtue of the contributions of human freedom and reason (which human capacities are
themselves, as parts of the created order, suffused with meaning and
value by virtue of divine wisdom and free choice).34 This part of the
29 See id. at 309.
30 See Genesis 1:27.
31 AQUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. I-I, prologue.
32 See id. at pt. I-II, q. 91, art. 2.
33 See id. at pt. I, q. 50, art. 4.
34 These points are explained more fully in Recent C7iticism of NaturalLaw Theory.
See George, supra note 12, at 1384-85. Unfortunately, a key line on page 1384 was
omitted by the printer in the version of this essay that appeared in the University of
Chicago Law Review. It would be better, therefore, for readers to consult the revised
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created order is governed by the principles of natural law, by which
free and intelligent creatures order their lives according to the directives of practical reason. In precisely this sense, "the natural law is a
participation of the eternal law" in the rational creature. 5
Does Aquinas's natural law theory presuppose religious premises?
Can it be accepted only by those who presuppose God's existence and
believe that He has revealed something of His will for human beings?
I have said enough already to indicate that the answer to these questions must be "no." At the same time, one may not infer from the fact
that principles of natural law, according to Aquinas's account, can be
understood and acted upon without appeal to religious premises that
God does not exist or that God's existence is simply irrelevant to natural law theory.
[lust as the fact that a good explanation of molecular motion can
be provided, without adverting to the existence of an uncreated creator of the whole state of affairs in which molecules and the laws of
their motion obtain, does not of itself entail either (i) that no further explanation of that state of affairs is required or (ii) that no
such further explanation is available, or (iii) that the existence of an
uncreated creator is not that explanation, so too the fact that natural law can be understood, assented to, applied, and reflectively analyzed without adverting to the question of the existence of God does
not of itself entail either (i) that no further explanation is required
for the fact that there are objective standards of good and bad and
principles of reasonableness (right and wrong) or (ii) that no such
that the existence and nafurther explanation is available, or (iii)
36
ture of God is not that explanation.
Let us now move beyond the opening paragraph of Kelsen's essay
to his critique of "the natural-law doctrine." His principal objection to
natural law theory is that it "obliterates the essential difference which
exists between scientific laws of nature, the rules by which the science
of nature describes its object, and the rules by which ethics and jurisprudence describe their objects, which are morality and law."3 7 This

objection boils down to the proposition that

version because it states, "While both parts, insomuch as they depend ultimately on
God's free action, are suffused with meaning and value, the latterpart is also suffused
with humanly given meaning and value (by virtue of the contributions of human intelliROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAw 31, 41
(1999) (emphasis added).

gence and free action)."

supra note 34, at 42.

35

GEORGE,

36

FINNIs, supra note 18, at 49.

37 KELSEN, supra note 1, at 139.
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[i] t does not follow from the fact that something is, that it ought to
be or to be done, or that it ought not to be or not to be done....
There is no logical inference from the "is" to the "ought," from natural reality to moral or legal value. 38
That certain natural law theorists (including some who have
claimed the patronage of Aquinas) have proposed to derive the
"ought" of morality from the "is" of (human) nature is true.39 It is
equally true, however, that Aquinas is not among them, nor are his
leading contemporary followers. 40 Although David Hume is widely
credited with discovering the logical fallacy inherent in any attempt at
such a derivation, 4 1 Aquinas, among other pre-modern thinkers, was
quite aware of the fallacy and sought more scrupulously than did
Hume himself to avoid committing it.42 Accepting Aristotle's distinction between "theoretical" (or "speculative") and "practical" reasoning, Aquinas insisted, as we have seen, that practical reasoning
proceeds from its own first principles. 43 He did not treat practical
principles as theoretical principles that are given normative force by
an act of the will. He did not treat theoretical knowledge of human
nature as providing a sufficient premise for practical knowledge, let
alone for practical knowledge of moral obligation. 4 4 He did not sup38 Id. at 140.
39 The origins of this approach to natural law theory are not in Aquinas, but
rather, in later writings such as those of the early seventeenth-century Spanish, Jesuit,
moral and political thinker Francisco Sudrez. See 1 FRANCISCO SuAREz, DE LEGIBus Ac
DE DEO LEGISLATORE (1612), in 2 SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO
SuAREz, S.J. 1, 58-73 (James Brown Scott ed., Gwladys L. Williams et al. trans., William
S. Hein & Co. 1995); 2 id, in 2 SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SuAREz,

S.J., supra, at 73-89. For a useful account of Sudrez's influence and valuable critique
of his approach to natural law theory, see FINNIs, supra note 18, at 43-47, 54-57,
337-43, 347-50.
40 Grisez and Finnis, for example, and other leading contemporary moral philosophers and theologians working broadly within the Thomistic tradition, explicitly reject as logically illicit any proposal to derive "ought" from "is." See FINNIs, supra note
18, at 33-36; GRISEZ, supra note 22, at 105.
41 For what is often taken to be Hume's statement of discovery of the logical
fallacy, see 2 DAVID HUME, A TREATxSE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. I, §1 (1740), in 2
DAVID HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORS

(Thomas Hill Green & Thomas Hodge

Grose eds., 1964).
42 On Hume's lack of care in this regard, see FINNIs, supranote 18, at 37-38 n.43.
43 See AQoUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 2.
44 Indeed, something very much like the reverse is true. A complete (theoretical)
account of human nature presupposes practical knowledge (a set of "value judgments") which provides data for theoretical inquiry, understanding, and judgment.
Aquinas adheres to the Aristotelian methodological (and epistemological) principle,
according to which we come to know human nature by knowing human potentialities;
these we know by knowing human acts and by knowing their objects, namely, the
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pose that, having first discovered the "facts" about human nature by
way of non-practical inquiry, we then identify ethical obligations by
'45
applying a norm such as "follow nature.
Hume and his followers, perhaps including Kelsen, 4 6 suppose
that if "values" cannot be derived from "facts," then they cannot be
objective (or "true"), but must, rather, be mere projections of feeling,
emotion, or other subrational factors capable of motivating human
behavior. 47 They deny that practical reasons, as such, can motivate
people. So they conclude that unless natural law theorists commit
"the naturalistic fallacy" of purporting to derive "ought" from "is,"
their doctrine collapses into a form of ethical non-cognitivism. 48 But
this simply begs the question against Thomists and others who claim
that we can understand, and thereby be motivated to act for the sake
of, more-than-merely-instrumental practical reasons. 49 It does a poor
job of accounting for the experience of most people who, after all,
often suppose that they are moved to do things (or to avoid doing
things that they might otherwise do) not as a matter of brute desire,
but rather because they perceive the worth or value, and thus the
practical point, of doing (or avoiding doing) them.5 0 Moreover, it
flies in the face of powerful retorsive arguments which show that any
truly knowledge-seeking defense of Humean moral skepticism, or
other forms of non-cognitivism, will be self-refuting inasmuch as it
contradicts in practice the very claims it seeks to defend in theory.5 1
Kelsen's claim that "from the point of view of science the naturallaw doctrine is based on the logical fallacy of an inference from the
more-than-merely-instrumental goods (bona) to which the self-evident and indemonstrable first principles of practical reason direct human choice and action. See FINms,

supra note 10, at 90-91.
45

All of this is made abundantly clear in Grisez, supra note 13. This unsurpassed

textual study corrects many common misunderstandings of Aquinas's theory of natural law including, notably, the idea that Thomistic ethical theory purports to deduce
the "ought" of morality from the "is" of (human) nature. See also GRISEz, supra note

22, at 103-05, 112 (observing that "St. Thomas was careful to explain that practical
conclusions always must be resolved into practical principles which are distinct from

and irreducible to theoretical ones").

46 See KELSEN, supra note 1, at 141.
47 SeeJeffrey Goldsworthy, Fact and Value in the New NaturalLaw Theory, 41 AM. J.
Juius. 21 (1996).
48 See id.
49 See Robert P. George, A Defense of the New NaturalLaw Theory, 41 AM.J.JuRus. 47
(1996). For a revised version of this essay, free of multiple printer's errors that make
it difficult for readers to grasp the sense of several sentences in the original, see
GEORGE,

50
51

supra note 34, at 18-33.

See George, supra note 49, at 49.
See FNos, supra note 10, at 58-61.
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'is' to the 'ought"' 52 simply has no force whatsoever against "the natural-law doctrine" as it is understood by Aquinas, for Aquinas's theory
of natural law proposes no such inference. When Kelsen goes on to
say that " [t] he norms allegedly deduced from nature are-in truthtacitly presupposed and are based on subjective values, which are
presented as the intentions of nature as a legislator, 5 3s again his critique has no applicability to Aquinas. To be sure, the critique itself, it
seems, tacitly presupposes the Humean idea that all "values" are subjective-that is, that people cannot be aware of and act on more-thanmerely-instrumental reasons as such-and this is in direct contradiction to Aquinas's view. But insofar as the truth of the Humean idea is
not obvious-indeed, that idea is, at best, highly problematic-Kelsen's marshaling of the idea in his critique of "the natural-law doctrine" need trouble no one interested in defending Aquinas or his
natural law doctrine. If the idea is to be marshaled effectively against
Aquinas and his contemporary followers, then its proponents must,
among other things, provide a plausible account of common moral
experience with which it is apparently incompatible, and they must
come to terms with the problems of retorsion that appear, at least, to
render any intellectually serious defense of the idea self-refuting.
II.

NATURAL LAW AND

PosriTvE

LAW

In the second section of his essay, Kelsen focuses on the natural
law doctrine of the relationship between natural and positive law. His
central claim against the doctrine here is that it renders the positive
law "superfluous. '54 "Faced by the existence of ajust ordering of society, intelligible in nature, the activity of positive-lawmakers is tantamount to a foolish effort to supply artificial illumination in bright
sunshine. '55 Yet, he insists,
[N] one of the followers of this doctrine had the courage to be consistent. None of them has declared that the existence of natural law
makes the establishment of positive law superfluous. On the contrary. All of them insist upon the necessity of positive law. In fact,
one of the most essential functions of all natural-law doctrines is to
justify the establishment of positive law or the existence of the state
competent to establish positive law. In performing this function
most of the doctrines entangle themselves in a highly characteristic
contradiction. On the one hand they maintain that human nature
52
53

KELSEN,

54
55

Id. at 142.
Id.

supra note 1, at 141.

Id.
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is the source of natural law, which implies that human nature must
be basically good. On the other hand they can justify the necessity
of positive law with its coercive machinery only by the badness of
56
man.
Here, I believe, Kelsen offers a spectacularly poor argument (or
pair of muddled-together arguments). It likely tells against no historically important natural law theorist, and it certainly casts no doubt on
Aquinas's theory. We have already seen that Kelsen's particular account of human nature as the "source of natural law" in natural law
doctrines has no applicability to Aquinas's teaching. Again, though it
is true that, for Aquinas, human goods are what they are because
human nature is constituted as it is, there is no sense in which Aquinas
proposes to deduce knowledge of human goods (practical knowledge) from methodologically antecedent (theoretical) knowledge of
human nature. The first principles of practical reason and the basic
precepts of natural law, which direct choice and action to the goods of
knowledge, friendship, and other more-than-merely-instrumental reasons for action-far from being inferred from anthropological, historical, metaphysical, theological, or any other theoretical premises-are
grasped in non-inferential acts of understanding whereby "the practical intellect"-one's single intelligence directed towards answering
the question of what is to be chosen and done-grasps the intelligible
point of a possible action in its promise to instantiate a human benefit, namely, something like knowledge or friendship that is humanly
57
fulfilling and, as such, worthwhile for its own sake.
Now, the fact that there are goods for human beings which, as
such, provide reasons for action, does not entail that there are no
bads. On the contrary, the privations of human goods (for example,
ignorance, muddleheadedness, misunderstanding, and animosity) are
bads that provide reasons (which may or may not, in any particular
case, be conclusive) for people to avoid them, where possible. 58 Nor
does the ability of human beings to understand certain ends or purposes as humanly fulfilling and, as such, good entail that human beings cannot choose in ways that are incompatible with the integral
directiveness of the human goods, that is, immorally. Indeed, one
56
57

Id. (footnotes omitted).
See AQUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 2.

58 See id. Aquinas formulates the first and most general principle of practical
reason as "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." Id. (emphasis
added). On the proper interpretation of this principle and, particularly, the meaning
of "good" and "bad" as including what is worthwhile and the privation of what is

worthwhile generally and not (merely) what is morally right and wrong, see generally
Grisez, supra note 13.
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can, for the sake of a certain good or the instantiation of goods in
certain persons, choose in ways that unreasonably damage or shortchange other goods or treat other persons unfairly.5 9 Any such choice
will be unreasonable inasmuch as one's reason for it was, in truth,
defeated by a conclusive (moral) reason against it. But a defeated
reason remains a reason-for unreasonable choices are not necessarily utterly irrational-albeit one that can be acted on by a person
who, at some level at least, understands the wrongfulness of his deed
only on the basis of emotional motives that compete with and cut back
60
upon or fetter reason.
One need not suppose that people are inherently "bad" in order
to acknowledge the evident truth that human emotions, when inadequately integrated in the human personality, can motivate people to
perform immoral acts. This is by no means to suggest that emotions
are themselves inherently bad or ought to be gotten rid of somehow.
(Indeed, in the properly integrated personality, emotions support
morally upright choosing.) It is only to say that people can be emotionally motivated to do things that are contrary to the integral directiveness of human goods-sometimes for the sake of genuine, albeit
partial, human goods to which they are deeply committed or attached. 61 And this fact about human beings is, in part, what calls for
and justifies the establishment of positive law and the existence of the
62
state competent to establish positive law.

At the same time, it is important to see that, in Aquinas's account
of the matter, positive law would remain necessary even in a human
society in which people could always be counted upon to do the morally right thing. This is because any society-even a "society of
saints"-needs laws and a system of lawmaking to provide authoritative stipulations for the co-ordination of actions for the sake of the
common good.65 Of course, in such a society, laws against murder,
59

See Germain Grisez et al., PracticalPrinciples,Moral Truth, and UtimateEnds, 32

AM. J. JuRis. 99, 123-25 (1987).

60
61

See id.
See id.

62 See AQUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. I-IL, q. 95, art. 1 (setting forth Aquinas's view
and addressing the question "Was it useful for laws to be framed by men?"); see also id.
at pt. I-TI, q. 96, art. 5 (discussing the question "Whether all are subject to the law?").
63 See FINNIS, supra note 10, at 35-37 (explaining Aquinas's position); FINNIS,
supra note 18, at 28 (same). Consistent with Aquinas's legal theory (and Aristotle's
thoughts in ARsToTLE, NicOMACHEAN ETHics bk. 5, ch. 7 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1985)), contemporary analytical jurisprudence has emphasized and valuably explored the importance of law in providing authoritative and, thus, binding
solutions to problems of coordinating human behavior for the sake of the common
good. See generally EDNA ULsmAN-MARcALrr, THE EMERGENCE OF NoRms (1977). For a
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rape, theft, and other morally wrongful acts would be unnecessary,
and punishment and other coercive features of real-life legal systems
would have no place since, ex hypothesi, no one would willfully fail to
abide by the law's just and authoritative stipulations. But the vast majority of laws by which people-particularly in complex modem societies-are governed in their daily lives as citizens would remain
pertinent.
Thus, Aquinas holds that positive law is necessary both because
actual human beings sometimes need the threat of punishment to deter them from doing what the natural law already proscribes (or to
require them to do what it prescribes) as a matter of basicjustice and
because authoritative stipulations are frequently needed to coordinate
action for the sake of the common good.64 And he further holds that
alljust positive laws-including laws that are purely norms of coordination-are derived, in some sense, from the natural law. 65 The task

of the legislator, he suggests, is to give effect to relevant principles of
natural law in the shape of principles and norms of positive law for the
governance of human society.
This work of giving effect to the principles of natural law is accomplished in two distinct ways, or two forms of "derivation." Some
laws, such as those prohibiting murder, rape, theft, and other grave
injustices which are straightforwardly contrary to natural law, are derived from the natural law by a process akin to the deduction of de66
monstrable conclusions from general premises in the sciences.
Other positive laws, however, cannot be derived from the natural law
in so direct and straightforward a fashion. Where law is required to
resolve a coordination problem, it is often the case that a variety of
possible solutions, all having certain incommensurable advantages
and disadvantages, are rationally available as options. One solution,
however, must be authoritatively chosen by the legislator if the problem is to be solved. Consider, for example, the regulation of highway
traffic. From the basic principle of natural law which identifies
human health and safety as goods to be preserved, together with the
empirical fact that unregulated driving, even among motorists of impeccable goodwill, places these human goods in jeopardy, it follows
that a scheme of regulation (coordination) is necessary for the comsummary of some important contemporary work in this area, with particular attention

to the question of a prima facie (defeasible) moral obligation to obey law, see John
Finnis, Law as Co-ordination, 2 RAno Jums 97 (1989).
64

SeeAQurms, supra note 4, at pt. I-II, q. 96, art. 4; FiNmms, supranote 10, at 248,

265.
65
66

See AQurns, supra note 4, at pt. I-H, q. 95, art. 2.
See id.
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mon good. Yet, typically, various reasonable but incompatible
schemes are possible. For the sake of the common good, then, the
relevant lawmaking authority must stipulate that one from among the
various possible schemes shall be given the force of law. In selecting a
scheme, the lawmakers operate not by any process analogous to the
deduction of demonstrable conclusions from premises, but rather by
a process of choosing between reasonable, yet incompatible, op67
tions-a process that Aquinas refers to as "determinatio."
Laws that come into being as determinationes, according to Aquinas, have their binding force not from reason alone, but also from
having been laid down by valid lawmaking authority. 68 Although it is
the case that, but for the law's enactment, no one would be under any
general moral duty to behave as it requires, and despite the fact that
the lawmaker(s) could, compatibly with the requirements of natural
law, have stipulated a different requirement or set of requirements,
"its directiveness derives not only from the fact of its creation by some
recognized source of law (legislation, judicial decision, custom, etc.),
but also from its rational connection with some principle or precept
of morality."

69

It is entirely clear, then, that the existence of natural law, as Aquinas conceives it, does not render positive law otiose. On the contrary,
Aquinas quite reasonably views positive law, and the institutions of
government that enjoy the power of lawmaking, to be indispensable to
the common good of any society-even a hypothetical society of
70
saints. They are themselves, as it were, requirements of natural law.
Although the binding force of (just) positive law always depends, in
part, on its derivation from principles of natural law, the positive law
in Aquinas's account of it is no mere emanation or simple reflection
of those principles. Indeed, insofar as human law is a matter of
determinatio, lawmakers enjoy a measure of rational, creative freedom
67 See id. On Aquinas's theory of determinatio,see FiNNis, supranote 10, at 266-74,
FiNNis, supra note 18, at 281-90, 294-96, and Robert P. George, Natural Law and
Positive Law, in THE AuTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYs ON LEGAL POSITmSM 321, 327-30

(Robert P. George ed., 1996).
68 See AQUiNAS, supra note 4, at pt. I-II, q. 104, art. 1.
69 FqNlIs, supra note 10, at 267 (footnote omitted).
70 I have had occasion elsewhere to explain the point as follows:
It is meaningful and correct to say that the legislator (including the judge to
the extent that the judge in the jurisdiction in question exercises a measure
of law-creating power) makes the natural law effective for his community by
deriving the positive law from the natural law. The natural law itself requires
that such a derivation be accomplished and that someone (or a group or
institution) be authorized to accomplish it.
George, supra note 67, at 329-30.
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that Aquinas himself analogizes to that of "the craftsman [or, as we
might say, architect who] needs to determine the general form of a
house to some particular shape," 7 1 yet who may design the structure,
compatibly with the purposes it is meant to serve, to any of a vast number of possible shapes. The existence of this freedom in no way entails the utter independence of positive law from natural law (any
more than the creative freedom of the architect entails the complete
independence of his determinationesfrom the general principles of architecture which must be observed if a house is to be structurally
sound and otherwise suitable for purposes of habitation, or from the
governing terms of his commission). But it also marks the reasons of
principle which Aquinas has for completely rejecting, as he does, the
notions ascribed by Kelsen to "natural-law doctrine"-that, given the
reality of natural law, positive law is "superfluous."
I.

NATuRAL LAW, UNJUST LAW, AND RESISTANCE TO TYRANNY

The third section of The Natural-LawDoctrine Before the Tribunal of
Science 2 introduces Kelsen's version of a familiar charge against natural law theory, namely, its alleged merging of the categories of "moral"
and "legal" such that either (1) all positive laws are morally good, or
(2) morally bad laws are in no meaningful sense truly laws. The section opens with the following sally against theorists of natural law:
If the positive law is, as all followers of the natural-law doctrine assert, valid only so far as it corresponds to the natural law, any norm
created by custom or stipulated by a human legislator which is contrary to the law of nature must be considered null and void. This is
the inevitable consequence of the theory which admits the possibility of positive law as a normative system inferior to natural law. The
extent to which a writer abides by this consequence is a test of his
sincerity. Very few stand this test. 73
71 AQUINAS, supranote 4, at pt. I-II, q. 95, art. 2; see also FINNs, supra note 10, at
309 & n.69 (citing THoMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILEs bk. 3, ch. 97 (VernonJ.
Bourke trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1975)).
72 KELSEN, supra note 1. The remaining sections (four through six) of Kelsen's
essay focus mainly on problems of state power and private property. He is particularly
concerned with post-Grotian thought, especially that of Locke, Comte, Spencer,
Hegel, and Marx. He claims that "the most outstanding champions of natural law,
from Grotius to Kant, have done their best to prove that private property is a sacred
right conferred by divine nature upon man." Id. at 153. While some of the issues he
raises could fruitfully be explored in light of Aquinas's teachings, I shall not conduct
that exploration in the present Essay. For a sound exposition of the Thomistic natural law doctrine of property, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., NaturalLaw, Ownership, and the
World's NaturalResources, 23J. VALUE INQUIRY 191 (1989).
73 KEIsEN, supra note 1, at 144.
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Those who fail the test-the vast majority-are driven inexorably,
Kelsen suggests, into the opposite position, namely, that "conflict between positive and natural law, although theoretically possible, is practically excluded." 74 Indeed, Kelsen goes so far as to allege that "the
natural-law doctrine has no other function than to justify the positive
law-any positive law established by an effective government."75 So,
in effect, the natural law theory, which begins by opening up in theory
the possibility of the radical moral critique of regimes of positive law
and government, ends by functioning in practiceas an ideological apologetic for existing regimes-whatever they happen to be.
Kelsen's principal targets here are Hobbes and Pufendorf, who,
he alleges, despite their differences in other important respects and
notwithstanding Pufendorf's critique of Hobbes's straightforward
identification of positive with natural law, hold in common the view
that the natural law must serve in the end to justify virtually any extant
regime of positive law. Kelsen argues, moreover, that
there is a principle advocated by all leading representatives of the
natural-law doctrine, by which a conflict between the natural and
the positive-if at all admitted as possible-is deprived of any effect
that could be dangerous to the established legal authority: it is the
dogma that under the law of nature there is no or only a restricted
76
right of resistance.
Is such an inherently "conservative" view justly attributable to
Aquinas?
A commonplace criticism of Aquinas is that his evident endorsement of Saint Augustine's statement that "a law that is notjust[] seems
to be no law at all"7 7 shows that he is guilty of merging the categories
of "legal" and "moral" in such a way as to render it analytically impossible for positive law and natural law to be in conflict. 78 (Of course,

Kelsen himself does not consider Aquinas's specific treatment of the
relationship of natural to positive law in the essay here under review;
Kelsen could not plausibly deny, however, that Aquinas's treatment
falls within what he says "all followers of the natural-law doctrine as74 Id. at 145.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
77 AQUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. I-II, q. 96, art. 4 (quoting AuGusTINE, DE LIBERO
Aurnuo bk. 1, ch. 5 (Francis E. Tourscher trans., The Peter Reilly Co. 1937) (1524)).
78 For example, Arthur G. Danto flatly ascribes to "the Thomistic defenders of
natural law" the belief that "there cannot be an unjust law." Arthur C. Danto, Human

Nature and NaturalLaw, in LAW AND
H.L.A.

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW

PHILOSOPHY 187

205-06 (1961).

(Sidney Hook ed., 1964); see also
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sert.") 79 We have already seen that Aquinas's account of the derivation of positive law from natural law is complex and, in certain
respects, quite subtle. Still further complexities and subtleties can be
brought into focus if we consider the context of Aquinas's endorsement of Augustine's statement.
It will become clear that Aquinas's conception of "law" and "legality" is every bit as rich and highly nuanced as the conceptions advanced by modem analytical legal philosophers. To be sure, Aquinas
does not go very far in carrying out the analytical work of explicitly
identifying the respects in which concrete instances of the phenomenon of human law can deviate from "law" in a social-theoretical "focal"
or "paradigmatic" sense (a sense, in part, built up out of consideration
of concrete instances, albeit from an "internal" viewpoint that itself
requires the application of critical-practical intelligence8 0 ) while still
retaining constitutive features of the concept of law. But he deploys
the term "law" in an appropriately flexible way to take into account
the differences between the demands of (1) intrasystemic legal analysis or argumentation (for example, in the context of professional legal
advocacy orjudging), (2) what we would call "descriptive" social theory (such as "sociology of law"), and (3) fully critical (such as "normative," "moral," and conscience-informing) discourse.
That Aquinas believed that laws could be and indeed sometimes
were unjust is evident both from his many explicit references to unjust
laws and from the very considerable attention he devoted to the problem of legal injustice.8 ' Central to his reflections were precisely the
questions whether and, if so, how and to what extent unjust laws bind
in conscience those subject to them to obey.8 2 It is clear that Aquinas
believed that human positive law creates a moral duty of obedience,
even where the conduct it commands (or prohibits) would, in the absence of the law (that is, morally, as a matter of natural law) be optional. This critical-moral belief in the power of positive law to create
(or, where moral obligation already exists, to reinforce) moral obligation naturally suggests the question of whether this power (and the
duties that are imposed by its exercise on those subject to it) is absolute or defeasible. If defeasible, under what conditions is it defeated?
79 KELsEN, supra note 1, at 144.
80 See FINNIs, supra note 18, at 11-19; HART, supra note 78, at 59-60, 86-88,
95-96, 113, 197, 226; JOSEPH RAZ, PRAcTICAL REASON AND NORMS 171, 177 (2d ed.
1990).
81 See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. I-I, q. 96, art. 4 (discussing the ways in
which a law may be unjust).
82 See id.
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To answer this question, it is necessary to press the critical-moral
analysis. What is the source of the power in the first place? Plainly it
is the capacity of law to serve the cause of justice and the common
good by, for example, coordinating behavior to make possible the
fuller and/or fairer realization of human goods by the community as a
whole. But, then, from the critical-moral viewpoint, laws that-due to
their injustice-damage rather than serve the common good lack the
central justifying quality of law. Their law-creating power (and the
duties they purport to impose) is, thus, weakened or defeated. Unjust
laws are, Aquinas says, "acts of violence rather than laws." 83 As violations of justice and the common good, they lack the moral force of
law; they bind in conscience, if at all, only to the extent that one is
under an obligation not to bring about bad side effects that would, in
the particular circumstances, likely result from one's defiance of the
law (such as causing demoralization or disorder,8 4 as by undermining
respect for law in a basically just legal system, or unfairly shifting the
burdens of a certain unjust law onto the shoulders of innocent fellow
citizens 85 ). That is to say, unjust laws bind in conscience, if at all, not
per se, but only per accidens. They are laws, not "simpliciter," or, as we
might say, in the "focal" or "paradigmatic" sense, but only in a derivative or secondary sense ("secundum quid").
Nothing in Aquinas's legal theory suggests that the injustice of a
law renders it something other than a law (or "legally binding") for
purposes of intrasystemic juristic analysis and argumentation. True,
he counsels judges, where possible, to interpret and apply laws in such
a way as to avoid unjust results where, as best they can tell, the
lawmakers did not foresee circumstances in which a strict application
of the rule they laid down would result in injustice and where they
would have crafted the rule differently, had they foreseen such circumstances. 86 But even here he does not appeal to the proposition
that the injustice likely to result from an application of the rule strictly
according to its terms nullifies those terms from the legal point of
view.
Nor does Aquinas say or imply anything that would suggest treating Augustine's comment that "an unjust law seems not to be a law" as
83

Id.

84 See id. Note, however, that according to Aquinas one may never obey a law
requiring one to do something unjust or otherwise morally wrong, and sometimes
disobedienceis required to avoid causing (or contributing to) demoralization or disorder. See id. For issues relevant to the translation of Aquinas's phrase "scandalum vel
turbatio," see FiNNis, supra note 10, at 223 n.23, 273 n.112, 274 n.d.
85

See AQUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. II-II, q. 60, art. 5.

86

See id.
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relevant to social-theoretical (or historical) investigations of what is
(or was) treated as law and legally binding in the legal system of any
given culture (however admirable or otherwise from the critical-moral
viewpoint). So, for example, though H.L.A. Hart was among those
who misunderstood Aquinas and his stream of the natural law tradition on precisely this point, no follower of Aquinas should suppose
that Hart's "descriptive sociology' of law errs by treating as laws (and
legal systems) various social norms (and social-norm-generating institutions) that filfill the criteria or conditions for legality or legal validity of Hart's concept of law, despite the fact that his social-theoretical
enterprise (reasonably!) prescinds to a considerable extent-indeed,
it seeks to prescind as far as possible-from critical moral evaluation
of laws and legal systems.8 7 The criticism Hart's work invites from a
natural law perspective has nothing to do with his willingness to treat
unjust laws as laws; rather, it has to do with his unwillingness to follow
through on the logic of his own method and his insight into the necessity of adopting or reproducing an internal point of view-a
method which, if followed through, will identify the focal or paradigmatic case of law as just law (law that serves the common good) and
the focal or paradigmatic case of the internal (or "legal") point of view
as the viewpoint of someone who understands law and the legal system
as valuable and legal rules as, ordinarily, binding in conscience because (or insofar as) they are just and, qua just, serve the common
good.88

With this background in mind, let us address directly the question of whether Aquinas ("like all followers of the natural-law doctrine") embraces some principle which excludes or effectively restricts
the right of people to resist tyranny or gravely unjust regimes of law.
Throughout his writings, Aquinas grapples with the 'problem of tyranny and, indeed, with the question of the legitimacy of tyrannicide.
In his early work, as well as in his most mature writings, he defends the
proposition, not only that the unjust acts of tyrants are devoid of
moral authority, but that they constitute a kind of criminality which
can justify revolutionary violence for the sake of the common good,
and even tyrannicide, as a kind of resistance to, and/or just punishment of, the tyrant.

87 See generally HART, supra note 78.
88 This criticism of Hart (and Raz) is carefully developed by Finnis. See FnNis,
supranote 18, at 12-18. On Hart's misinterpretation of Aquinas on these matters, see
id- at 351-66.
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It is true that one work, De Regno ad Regem Cypri,8 9 a theological
treatise from Aquinas's middle period written to inform the conscience of a Christian king, suggests disapproval of tyrannicide. This
work is probably authentic, or at least substantially so, though some
responsible commentators have doubted Aquinas's authorship. 90
However that may be, even John Finnis, who treats the work as probably authentic, warns that it is "never a fully reliable and satisfactory
source for the opinion of Aquinas." 91 The warning seems particularly
apt with respect to the question of tyrannicide in view of the inconsistency of the teaching of De Regno both with earlier and later works of
unquestioned authenticity and great clarity.
Tyranny, for Aquinas, paradigmatically is rule (whether by the
one, the few, or the many) in the private interests, or for the private
ends, of the ruler or rulers at the expense of the common (public)
good. 92 The tyrant, in effect, uses, rather than serves, those over
whom he exercises power and for whose sake (from the critical-moral
viewpoint) public authority exists. 93 Aquinas's earlier writings distinguish between two types of tyranny: (1) the tyranny of those who
abuse authority that they legitimately acquired and hold and (2) the
tyranny of those who obtained and hold power by usurpation. 94 He
suggests that usurping tyrants-as, in effect, parties making war
against the political community-may legitimately be resisted and
even killed by anyone who has the effective power to do so. 9 5 By contrast, where legitimate rule has degenerated into tyranny, the tyrants
are entitled to something which we might call "due process of law." It
is up to other public officials, operating as such, and not (ordinarily)
to private citizens to overthrow their regimes and, if necessary, bring
them personally to trial and punishment (including, where appropriate, capital punishment).96
It is noteworthy that in his most mature writings, Aquinas, as Finnis observes, "seems to have lost interest in the contrast between
89 THOMAS AQUINAS, ON KINGSHIP TO THE KING OF CYPRUS (Gerald B. Phelan
trans., 1949).
90 See, e.g., I.T. Eschmann, St. Thomas Aquinas on the Two Powers, 20 MEDIAEVAL
STUDIES 177 (1958).
91 FiNNis, supra note 10, at 288; see also id. at 228, 254 n.d.
92 See AQUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. II-IL, q. 42, art. 2.
93 See id. at pt. I-II, q. 105, art. 1. Note Aquinas's claim that tyrants "prey[] on
their subjects" and rule them "as though they were... slaves." Id.
94 See FImNis, supra note 10, at 289-90.
95 See 2 AQUINAS, supra note 7, at d. 44, q. 2, art. 2.
96 On the distinction between usurping tyrants and legitimate rulers who degenerate into tyranny, see FINNIs, supra note 10, at 289-90 and the sources cited therein.
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usurpers and other kinds of tyrant."97 In the Summa Theologica, he
treats tyranny of any kind as an essentially criminal type of rule-indeed, a form of sedition-that can justify the revolutionary action of
the people and the punishment of the tyrants. 98 (I say "can" justify
since, as always for Aquinas, a final moral judgment as to the justice of
resorting to force must take into account the impact of likely unintended bad side effects. Otherwise, morally permissible revolutionary
action might, in any particular case, be unjust to innocent third parties who would, in the circumstances, be made unfairly to bear the
burdens of such side effects.)
Aquinas's "natural-law doctrine," then, does not subscribe to the
principle (advocated, according to Kelsen, by all leading representatives of the natural law doctrine) which "deprives of any effect" conflicts between positive and natural law "which could be dangerous to
the established legal authority."99 Although Aquinas does not treat
the right of revolution in the face of tyranny as absolute, he plainly
does not embrace Kelsen's alleged "dogma that under the law of nature there is no or only a restricted right of resistance." 10 0 Tyrantsnot least those who came to power by legal means and govern by issuing and enforcing laws (lex tyrannica)' 0 1 -must look elsewhere, rather
than to Aquinas, for moral arguments designed to insulate them from
insurrection and punishment for their misrule. Nothing in his
thought merges natural and positive law in such a way as to confer
upon positive law an automatic conformity to the requirements of natural law. On the contrary, according to Aquinas, the positive law of
any regime and those rulers who create and enforce it stand under
the judgment of natural law. Tyrannical rule is a "perversion of
law,"' 0 2 and, as such, far from creating a duty of obedience, it gives
rise to a (prima facie) right of resistance to the uttermost.
CONCLUSION

Despite his sometimes sweeping statements about its substance
and what "all" of its principal exponents have held, we have seen that
Kelsen's exposition of "the natural-law doctrine" has virtually no
points of contact with Aquinas's thought. Hence, Kelsen's critique of
97 Id. at 290 (citing AQUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. II-II, q. 42, art. 2, and id at pt.
II-II, q. 104, art. 6).
98 See AQUINAS, supra note 4, at pt. II-II, q. 42, art. 2.
99 KmtsaN, supra note 1, at 148.
100 Id.
101 See AQuINAS, supra note 4, at pt. I-I, q. 92, art. 1.
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the doctrine has little or no applicability to Thomistic natural law theory. Neither Aquinas's theory of the identification of natural law principles, nor his account of their relation to divine power and to positive
law, nor his views regarding their implications for the problems of
legal injustice and tyranny are captured in Kelsen's exposition and
critique. Kelsen did well, one might conclude, to avoid mentioning
Aquinas, if he was to insist on describing "the natural-law doctrine" as
he did. Still, it is odd, to say the least, for the "tribunal of science" to
have left unheard and unmentioned the thought of so central an exponent of the natural law tradition.

